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HISTORIC PERIODS IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF OUR LAW
By HUGH E. WILLIS
Professor of Law, Indiana University
HERE are five historical periods in the develop-ment of Anglo-American law. Dean RoscoePound has named these periods: 1. The Period
of Archaic Law; 2. The Period of Strict Law; 3. The
Period of Equity, or Natural Law; 4. The Period of
the Maturity of Our Law, and 5. The period of the
Socialization of Our Law'.
The Archaic, or Primitive, Period in our law suc-
ceeded the period of no law, in early English history.
The object of the law in this period was to secure the
peace. Prior to this period every man had been a law
unto himself. Vengeance and self-help had been the
order of the day. The consequence of such a policy
was unsafety for everyone. Hence the first effort of
society was to preserve the peace. It undertook to do
this by regulating vengeance. Individuals and fami-
lies, however, then considered vengeance and self-help
as things which peculiarly belonged to them. For this
reason the first effort was not to destroy them, but to
regulate them. This was done by substituting a com-
position for vengeance. The avenger was bought off.
Roman law and Hebrew law had this same period in
the development of their law. In Hebrew law it was
characterized by the institution of cities of refuge and
by the provisions for buying off the avenger. This
period did not contribute very much law, but it marks
a great step in the historical development of our law
because it made the other periods possible. It estab-
lished the principle that law should be substituted for
lawlessness in the government of human relations.
Through the years this principle has been applied more
and more, until today there is very little of the prin-
ciple of self-help left in the relations of one individual
with another. What civilization we have is very
largely due to the application of this principle. Un-
fortunately the principle has been applied only in the
settlement of disputes between individuals. So far as
social classes are concerned and so far as the larger
units of the nations are concerned the law of England
and the United Stated (and of the world), is still in
its Archaic, or Primitive period..
The Period of Strict law followed the Archaic
period. It began in Anglo-Saxon history and extended
through Norman history as far as the sixteenth cen-
tury. The purpose of law in this period also was se-
curity, but it attained this purpose, not by regulating
primitive self-help, but by supplanting it so far as in-
dividuals were concerned and substituting therefor its
own processes, or remedies. The law in this period
was characterized by formality. When law was in the
making people thought that their protection against
tyrants lay in such formality. They sought this sort
I. Pound: The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and
Doctrines. 27 Harv. L. Rev. 195; The End of Law as Developed in
Juristic Thought, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 605, S0 Harv. L. Rev. 201; Interests
of Personality, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 343, 445; Equitable Relief Against
Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640; The
Spirit of the Common Law; An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law.
The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Dean Pound, not
only for what may be found in this short article, hut for the help he
has received in coming to an understanding of the historical develop-
ment and the philosophical and sociological principles underlying our
entire system of Anglo-American law, and for the stimulation and in.
spiration which Mr. Pound's writings always give.
of protection before they would relinquish what they
regarded as their right to obtain their own redress. But
the consequence was that they created in their formal-
ity a greater tyrant than any against which they were
trying to protect themselves, and that brought into ex-
istence the next or third period in our law. Most of
the formality and technicality of the second period of
our law has been ameliorated if not outgrown, espe-
cially in the field of substantive law; but in the field of
adjective law, or procedure, at least in the United
States, the law is to a large extent still where it was
in this early period of Strict law, and some parts of
our substantive law, like real property and considera-
tion in contracts, still bear the marks of Strict law.
The Third Period in the development of our law
was Equity (or natural law in other systems). In
this period, which extended from the sixteenth through
the seventeenth and into the eighteenth century, the
pendulum swung to the opposite extreme. There was
such a revulsion against the law of the Strict Period
that justice was administered for a time by a new
system of courts which sprang into existence, with al-
most no formal -rules. The end of the law in this
period was justice. There was a tendency to identify
law and morals, and to emphasize duties rather than
remedies. This was essentially a reform period, apld
after it has remedied the most glaring defects of the
law as it emerged from the period of Strict law and
as it had been administered by the common law courts,
the pendulum again swung backward towards the pe-
riod of Strict law, and as a consequence we got the
period of the Maturity of our law.
The period of the Maturity of our law ran from
the eighteenth through the nineteenth century. The
end of law in this period was equality of opportunity
and security of acquisitions. Security became an end
of law again, as in the strict period, but the influence
of equity was not entirely eliminated. . The pendulum
did not swing all the way back to Strict Law. How-
ever, the swing was far enough so that form and tech-
nicality again begap to have a large place. Rights were
emphasized rather than the correlative duties which
Equity had emphasized. Property and contract be-
came the all important considerations. Individualism
and freedom of contract were the universal "cure-alls."
The law would probably have taken this development
if there had been no other outside factors contributing
to this result, but the development was undoubtedly ac-
celerated and given momentum by the philosophies and
economic theories of the day. This was the period of
the "natural rights of man," of "laissez faire," the
"law of competition," the "law of supply and demand,"
and of "individualism." Our bills of rights, the Dec-
laration of Independence and other immortal docu-
ments were written in this period, and that of course
accounts for the philosophy and economic theories em-
bodied in them, although this fact is sometimes for-
fotten. The result was an over-emphasis of legal
rights. Dissatisfaction, perhaps more unconscious than
conscious, again arose; and just as the pendulum swung
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away from the second to the third period of our law,
so it swung away from the fourth to the fifth and last
period.
The present period in the historical development
of our law, which Dean Pound has called the period
of the Socialization of our law, began with the twen-
tieth century, but when it will end cannot at the pres-
ent time be told. The chief characteristic of present
law is the emphasis of interests. The natural result
of the over-emphasis of rights in the period of the
maturity of the law was to raise the question of why
individuals had their rights. The answer was, be-
cause there was a social interest that they should have
them. When this was discovered, people also discov-
ered that there were other social interests than those
which had been emphasized in the nineteenth century,
and the consequence was a new period of development
in the law. People saw that the historical order was
not the natural order but that historically the natural
and logical order had been reversed. Individuals had
rights and duties because only thus could certain social
interests be secured, and remedies were given as a
means of enforcement of such rights and duties. Hence
social interests have become the all important things.
Unless rights and duties and remedies are furthering
some social interest there is no sufficient reason for
their existence. If one social interest is more import-
ant than another, the one of less importance must yield
to the other. The end of.the law has now become the
satisfaction of as many human wants as possible; to
make legal justice social justice; to give fair play be-
tween groups as well as between individuals. This has
given us what has been called sociological jurispru-
dence, as the jurisprudence of the twentieth century.
The chief exponents of this jurisprudence are von
Jhering in Germany, Leon Duguit in France and Ros-
coe Pound in the United States. There is a close rela-
tion now, as in the nineteenth century, between law
and the other social sciences and philosophy, but philos-
ophies and economic theories have changed.
There are some people even in the legal profession
who do not know that our law has had these five periods
in its development. There are people teaching law,
and practicing law, and administering law from the
bench who think of the law as having only one period
and that the period of their own mental development.
If that happens to be the period of strict law, they
want the law strict law; if the period of Equity they
want the law equity, and so on. They can't realize
that the first thing to do in accounting for a decision
unless it was by a court like themselves is to find out
the period in which it was decided. These men can-
not realize that the law of the twentieth century is
different from the law of the nineteenth century. Yet
that such is the fact is very easy of proof. Uses of
property which were upheld as rights in the nine-
teenth century will not be tolerated today with its
scheme of social interests. For example, a spite fence
is no longer legal, property may be taken in the exer-
cise of the police power for esthetic purposes, the right
of a husband to dispose of his property is limited so
that he must have his wife join in the conveyance, the
powers of creditors and other injured parties are lim-
ited by the exemption laws, and things formerly classed
as res communis and res nullius are now classed as
res publicae. Freedom of contract is being limited by
taking the law of insurance and the law of public call-
ings out of the realm of contract, and by making more
and more things illegal as the subject-matter of con-
tract. Liability, as in the workman's compensation
laws, is being imposed without fault. Society is tak-
ing an interest in the dependent members of the house-
hold. Taxation laws are not based now on the prin-
ciple of equality but on the principle of ability to pay.
If it was not for this change of theory our graduated
income tax laws and our graduated inheritance tax laws
would be unconstitutional. Important movements for
the reform of legal procedure are being inaugurated.
Yes. Our law has always been in process of change.
Changes are now going on in it. This is right. To
say that our law should remain what it was at the end
of the nineteenth century would be as foolish as it
would be to say that it should be what it was in the
time of William the Conqueror. What it will be in
the future, no one can say with authority. Its future
will depend upon its best development and the desires
of society. It goes without saying that it will be some-
thing different fiom what it now is or ever has been.
Newspaper Publicity and Crime
"Comment has been current of late in legal
publications as to 'trial by newspaper,' meaning
thereby the tendency of the press to give continued
and sensational publicity to a 'murder mystery.'
Much there is in this phase of journalistic enter-
prise which is worthy of condemnation. Innocent
people are given a disagreeable publicity, and sus-
picions are engendered on mere speculation which
linger for years in the popular mind. Yet there is
a consideration favoring such publications which is
rarely adverted to. By the Statute of Winchester
(13 Edw. I.) 'from henceforth every county shall
bd so well kept, that immediately upon robberies
and felonies committed, fresh suit shall be made
from town to town, and from county to county;
and that hue and cry shall be raised upon the
felons, and they that keep the town shall follow
with hue and cry, with all the town and the towns
near; and so hue and cry shall be made from town
to town until they be taken and delivered to the
sheriff.' The 'hue and cry' has gone out of exist-
ence. In its day, it was the only means of com-
municating the news to the people that they might
be alert to capture a fleeing felon or communicate
to the authorities evidence where the offender was
unknown. The press has taken its place as an in-
strument of public intelligence, and so when a dead
body is found in the public street or in a lonely
field it but fulfills an ancient junction when it cries
'Murder! Murder!' up and down the land. Local
authorities may be supine, incompetent or even
corrupt. Being unable or unwilling to apprehend
the criminal they are all too willing to let the mat-
ter be hushed up and forgotten. But with that cry
ringing daily in the land it cannot be forgotten;
higher authorities are roused to ask why the crimi-
nal has not been found; ofttimes those bound by
interest or favor to silence become afraid longer
to keep silent. The criminal hearing the hue and
cry ever behind him may by some rash act betray
his guilt. Of course to the lawyer's mind the man-
ner in which the press presents the matter is in-
tolerably shallow and sensational, but such is the
nature of our people that nothing- less would
arouse continued interest. It is open to argument
whether the administration of law would not be
better if the glaring calcium light of newspaper
publicity rested on it more frequently and was not
reserved for cases involving some morbid sex
theme.'--Law Notes, (Feb.).
